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$700,000.00 FOR COMPANIONSHIP

C

By OMAR E. GARWOOD, of the Denver Bar
OLONEL LANKERSHIM was an old-time and wealthy

resident of Los Angeles. After his death one Irene
Herbert, alias Mrs. Edres Herbert, made claim against
the estate for $500,000.00 and interest, basing her case upon
an extraordinary piece of paper resembling a draft or check,
a photographic print of which appears on page 224 of 71
Pacific 2nd. It bore the Colonel's signature, and apparently
called for the payment to her of this extraordinary sum of
money one month atfer his death. Payment being refused,
the claimant brought suit, and in her quest for a consideration
she set up services as companion, assisting in dressing and
undressing the old gentleman, consoling and nursing him, and
protecting him from designing persons.
A Los Angeles jury awarded her the full amount, which
with interest mounted up to $700,000.00, and when the
District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, it appeared
that Irene's $700,000.00 was surely in the bag. The Supreme Court of California, however, chose to view the transaction with most scrutinizing jealousy and arrived at the conclusion that it was against a designing Irene that the Colonel
most needed protection; in a 37-page opinion it reversed the
case under such terms that it will never be retried, and all hope
of compensation for these questionable services has evaporated.
The case is of interest to Denver lawyers who remember
Edward L. Auslender, a member of the Colorado bar, who
moved to Los Angeles in 1930 and became one of the attorneys for the Lankershim Estate, and of special interest is the
spectacular testimony of scientists on the subject of inks, dye
and ink absorptions, as well as handwriting experts such as
Dr. Robert S. Osborne of New York, James Clark Sellers
of the University of Southern California, Dr. Hendrikson of
the Huntington Library, and Professor Briton of the Depart325
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ment of Analytical Chemistry of the University of Southern
California. They gave very convincing opinions to the effect
that the small checks or draft written by none other than the
venturesome Irene herself, was materially altered after the
Colonel's signature had been executed; the spreading of ink at
the creases disclosed that important words had been written
in after the instrument had been folded, and the experts were
able to show clear instances where ink on the creases had penetrated through to the back of the instrument. Blotting of
words and figures also played an important part in their testimony, and convincingly led to the conclusion that the paper
had originally been written for $500.00, and subsequently
raised to $500,000.
As elsewhere, the appellate courts of California are reluctant to interfere with a judgment entered by a fact-finding
body where there is a substantial conflict in the evidence, but
in this instance the court followed the rule that a mere conflict of words is not sufficient and as respects appellate review,
the contrary evidence must be of a substantial character such
as reasonably supports the judgment; that while jurors are
the sole judges of facts, the question of there being substantial evidence to support a plaintiff's case is one of law for the
court, and in determining such question the credulity of the
courts is not to be deemed commensurate with the facility or
vehemence with which a witness swears.
The Estate set up numerous defenses, among which were
that material alterations were made after execution, that fraud
and deceit were practiced by a comely woman upon an old
man in failing health at a time when waning faculties had
rendered him unable to resist the wiles and importunities of
designing persons, tampering and raising thefigures in a written instrument, lack of consideration and grossly inadequate
consideration. The instrument discloses that the fifth cipher
differs quite pronouncedly from the other ciphers in size, pen
pressure, formation and color intensity, indicating that the
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figures were originally $500.00, and were raised by adding
one new cipher and making the period resemble a comma so
as to read $500,000. The last cipher shows that it was
blotted immediately after being written, while the other
ciphers show no blotting, indicating that the last cipher was
added some time after the original figures were written.
Mrs. Herbert had plenty of friends to testify to numerous
conversations with the Colonel during his lifetime, and one
of them who claimed to have been present when the instrument was signed and delivered, performed the miraculous
economic feat on the witness stand of reproducing word for
word an instrument most peculiar in its phraseology which
she had heard read but once, and which had not been seen or
discussed by her or anyone else in her hearing for the full
period of five years. This was too much for the Supreme
Court of California; it could not put trust in such remarkable feats of memory.

ENDORSING NAMES OF WITNESSES ON
INFORMATIONS

M

By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver Bar

EMBERS of committees on Criminal Procedure have
laboriously searched for defects in the administration of criminal justice in order to have some reform
to recommend or "report" to make to a bar association. Yet
there is one obvious imperfection in our code that seems to
have been ignored. It is the requirement that names of witnesses be endorsed on the information or indictment. The
necessity for that practice hampers and burdens the prosecution without giving any substantial benefit to an innocent
accused.
If the accused is guilty, he does not deserve the statutory
aid or favor. If he is innocent, he derives little, if any, help
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from the code provision. He knows who the perjurers will
be without being given a list of them in advance. If the proposed witnesses are honest, still their names are of little use
to him. They will not likely reveal to him their intended
testimony, nor will he be disposed to visit them in an effort
to find out what they think they know relevant to his case.
If the defendant is guilty, he already knows who the
potential witnesses are. To be given a list of them, as relied
on by the district attorney, simply enables him to determine
whom to frighten, dissuade from appearing, bribe, etc. In
some states prospective witnesses have been killed before the
date set for trial. If killing is not contemplated, the defendant at least knows whom he desires to brand as a "rat" that
has "squealed." The citizen willing to testify then becomes
odious not only to the criminal but also to all of the latter's
associates. Prospective witnesses know this. Hence persons
will, if possible, avoid being witnesses. That is where and
why prosecuting officials are greatly hampered.
By way of a "P. S." something may be said of the psychology of, for example, a swindler. His conscience seems
not to be troubled over his having defrauded aged widows,
but his ethical sense does cause his indignation to reach a high
pitch when discovering that some acquaintance has become
so depraved as to divulge information to a district attorney.
And the rabble sympathize with him. Unpopular as it is to
snoop," particularly on politicians, it is even more so to
"squeal."
Hence the "prohibitionists" used to refrain from
reporting law violations known to them, but employed stool
pigeons instead. One is disposed to feel like a despised
squealer when he permits his name to be endorsed on an iiformation, even though knowing he is performing a public duty.
For the sake of the witnesses, as well as of the prosecution,
our committees on Criminal Procedure ought to consider the
subject herein briefly discussed.

IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
By BOYLE G. CLARK
GENERAL CHAIRMAN
BAR COMMITTEES OF MISSOURI

(Committees of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations during the past few
years have endeavored, without success, to bar laymen from the practice of law in
Colorado. In a great many other states like committees have been successful. We are
privileged to print this article and feel that it will be worthwhile to every lawyer
to read it carefully.)

Mr. Chairman, Members of the American and Missouri Bar
Associations, Ladies and Gentlemen:
1. What is the reason for the decline of the Profession of law in
the public estimation?
In a current issue of the Journal of the American Bar Association
there are recalled to mind the remarks of John Randolph of Roanoke
in announcing to Congress the death of William Pinkney in 1822. In
part, Randolph is quoted as follows:
"I rise to announce to the House the unlooked-for death of a man
who filled the first place in the public estimation in the first profession
in that estimation in this or any other country."
What speaker of today, unless he be musing by the ashes of extinguished fires, would refer to our profession as the first profession in the
estimation of the public? We all admit that such a declaration could
not be made without the fear of challenge.
The reasons for the decline of the profession in the estimation of
the public may differ in the minds of those who have given the subject
consideration. I believe, however, that a reading of the great number of
contemporary comments on the legal profession will evoke one underlying thought as the basis of the trouble with the profession. Simply
stated, the complaint is that the lawyer has gradually but continuously
and surely adopted the practices and the standards of the business world.
He has done this at the expense of his ideal of public service, service to
his government and service to his people as a whole.
2. Should only lawyers practice law?
We have become convinced in Missouri that the adoption of the
standards and the practices of the business world are the direct result
of the bar's -being compelled to compete, in its own field, with unauthorized practitioners of the law and compelled to deal with other commercial influences which have projected themselves into the domain of
the lawyer. We had always assumed, as the law of the land dictated,
that only lawyers should practice law. Upon the assumption that only
lawyers should practice law the organized bar in concerted effort has
proceded to suppress the unauthorized practitioner and to combat what
we assumed to be the subversive commercial influences which were and
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are gradually forcing downward the lawyer's standard of professional
conduct.
Imagine then, the astonishment of the majority of the bar when
this movement was met with the confident assertion of those who are
commercializing the practice of law, that the handling of all law practice by lawyers is not in the public interest; that it is not true that only
lawyers should practice law; that the public demands the services of
laymen in the handling of certain phases of the practice of law. The
bar has been thus forced to a re-examination of its original position in
the unauthorized practice drive, namely, that, in the interest of the
public, a prerequisite to the handling of law practice is the obtention
of a certificate from the government of the state that the practitioner is
possessed of superior skill, sound moral character and is imbued with the
principles of professional conduct exemplified by the Canons of Ethics.
Imagine further the astonishment of a majority of the bar when it
learned that a considerable minority of the bar maintained that the
original premise is false and that the unauthorized practitioner is necessary to the conduct of business.
Some of you no doubt read with dismay the report of the statement made by Mr. John W. Davis that lawyers should not attempt
to eliminate the handling by laymen of legal matters before federal
commissions exercising judicial functions because it would cause the
public impression that lawyers were trying to achieve a monopoly in
dealing with the government.
At the last meeting of the American Bar Association one hundred
twenty-six business concerns of the city of St. Louis addressed a communication to the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law of
the American Bar Association expressing their disapproval of the effort
to eliminate adjustment bureaus and collection agencies, their disapproval of the rule against bonded law lists, and their disapproval of
the rule against the circulation of lists among laymen. The protest
concludes wtih the statement: "The undersigned therefore requests in
the public interest that they [the Committee] use their influence to end
the agitation and uncertainty."
This protest contains signatures of
old, recognized and established firms such as Simmons Hardware Company, Curlee Clothing Company, Pet Milk Sales Corporation, Otis
Elevator Company, General Electric Supply Corporation, Westinghouse Electric Supply Company, Buxton Z4 Skinner Printing and Stationery Company, Ely-Walker Dry Goods Company and other recognized outstanding business establishments in this state.
It is fairly to be assumed that the business organizations signing
this protest represent the sentiment of some business interests of St.
Louis with reference to the program in Missouri for the suppression
of the unauthorized practice of law. While it is evident that the protest was drawn by those directly interested in the profits of the unauthorized practice, yet the fact that it is concurred in by the credit
managers of numerous business institutions challenges our consideration.
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Who says that in the public interest laymen should be permitted to handle some phases of law practice?
From whom comes the cry that the handling of commercial law
practice and the handling of the insurance adjustment work by laymen
is in the public interest? From whom comes the cry that the maintenance of the unapproved law lists as an instrument of the unauthorized
practioner is in the public interest? From whom comes the cry that
accountants and so-called lay experts should be permitted to practice
before governmental boards and bureaus exercising judicial functions?
We have analyzed the body of the complainants and have found that
they are composed of (1) the lawyers who directly or indirectly connect
themselves with financial institutions and lay organizations for the
purpose of securing business; (2) the lawyers affiliated with business
interests who believe the services of the unauthorized practitioners before governmental boards and commissions are necessary to procure
advantages which they desire, advantages which are procured at the
expense of the public interest; (3) the lawyers who benefit from the
solicitation and parceling out of law practice by lay agencies; (4) as you
no doubt suspect, from the unauthorized practitioners themselves who
are beginning to feel the result of the bar's activity; (5) businesses
which have been led to believe by the unauthorized practitioners that
the bar is incompetent to fully serve their interests in the field of law;
(6) the publishers of the unapproved law lists whose revenue is endangered by reason of the losing of their control over the parceling out
of law practice.
3.

4. Why do they say it?
The identification of the complainants establishes the reason for
the complaint. It is merely this: that these people have purposely or
inadvertently confused the public interest with their own private pecuniary interests.
5. What is the Public Interest?
Properly defined, we think that is in the public interest which is
of the greatest good to the most of the people. Needless to say those
opposing the suppression of the unauthorized practice and commercial
influence over the bar, who are the same as those whose interests are
adversely affected, constitute a negligible minority of the public. So
on the score of direct pecuniary loss to the public by the suppression of
unauthorized practice the great majority are not affected.
6. Is the bar attempting to achieve a monopoly?
Against the charge that in suppressing the unauthorized practice
the bar is attempting to achieve a monopoly this may be said. The
profession of law is not and has never been a monopoly. Any person
who is willing to undergo the training, who possesses the necessary
intellectual and moral qualifications will find and has always found the
doors of the profession open to him or her. It could as well be charged
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that licensing of drivers of motor vehicles achieves a monopoly in that
field. There is never a monopoly where all are admitted to the enjoyment of the privileges upon the same equitable conditions and where
admission is perpetually open to the qualified applicant.
7. Is the handling of all law practice by lawyers free of commercial influences, in the public interest?
This leaves but one question, namely, can the bar demonstrate
that the practice of law as a profession, subject to professional standards
of conduct and requiring superior, intellectual and moral qualifications
is of greater public benefit than unregulated, unrestricted practice of law?
(a) The adjustment field.
Let us answer this question by specific examples, not intended to
be all-inclusive. A person is injured by the negligent conduct of another who is insured against loss thereby. The insurer is entitled to
defend or compromise the claim. The company may handle its adjustment either through lawyers, or through lay employees. Let us assume
that the injury is severe, and the matter of adjustment is placed in the
hands of a layman. Liability is so patent that even the lay adjuster
must realize it. As happens too often this lay adjuster calls upon the
claimant, finds that he is poor and portrays to him large medical expense, hungry mouths to be fed, rent to be paid, and under the stress
of the circumstances procures an unconscionable cheap settlement. Will
any man say that this is in the public interest?
Let us suppose that the same insurance company employs a lawyer
who is sensitive to his ethical responsibilities, which are synonymous
with public responsibilities, who upon contacting the claimant, finds
that he is unrepresented by counsel, and unadvised as to his rights. He
instructs the claimant to secure competent advice which results in an
equitable evaluation of the claim, and consequent settlement, on an
equitable basis. Is there any man who would say that it is not more
in the public interest for this matter to be thus handled by a lawyer
than by a lay adjuster?
(b) The commercial field.
Let us look at the commercial field. There we find the lay collection agencies soliciting commercial law practice from businesses and
in turn we find unapproved law lists soliciting this practice from lay
collection agencies for its listees. While it is not pertinent here, let me
remark that the collection agency places the practice with the law list's
lawyer upon condition that a-portion of the fee be paid to the agency.
The law list levies further tribute upon the lawyer by charging him
upon the basis of the business it is able to obtain for him. When we
began to suppress these practices in Missouri, the collection agencies
and the unapproved law lists, which were not content to sell the book
but were selling the law practice which they controlled through organized solicitation, raised the cry that regardless of ethical considerations
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their activities should not be questioned because they were being carried
on in the public interest.
We heard that same argument advanced in another connection,
in a situation where the conduct of members of the bar was questioned.
I refer to the suppression of the solicitation of silicosis cases in Missouri.
Lawyers in the industrial districts were engaged in organized and systematic solicitation of suits arising from occupational diseases. Unquestionably the rights of the workmen involved in those cases in a
great many instances were violated by the employers who had failed to
provide modern equipment. As a result, the workmen contracted diseases. They did not know their rights; they had no money to obtain
medical advice; they were not advised that the employers were accountable for the wrong done them. These cases were solicited, suits were
filed and damages, rightfully owed, were collected for the claimants.
When the lawyers engaged in this solicitation were charged with unprofessional conduct, they, and many for them, urged that the solicitation of these cases should not be condemned because it was in the public
interest that these suits be brought. In remarkable contrast to the position now attributed to business interests, the businesses of the area
affected, including many not involved in the litigation, applauded the
efforts of the Bar Committees, and offered to subsidize suppression of
this solicitation. We conceived solicitation in this instance to be unprofessional and inimical to the ultimate public interest and proceeded
to secure discipline of the lawyers involved. There can be only one
standard to apply in the administration of justice. Solicitation of law
practice is either right or it is wrong and if wrong when engaged in by
the personal injury lawyer it is wrong when engaged in by the commercial practitioner. And it matters not whether the solicitation is
effected through the agency of a runner on the streets or through organized "snitches" of commercial practice such as collection agencies and
the unapproved law lists. If it is in the public interest to suppress
the solicitation of personal injury claims, it is in the public interest to
suppress the solicitation of commercial law practice.
8. Unauthorizedpractitionerscombined with other intermediaries.
Unauthorized practitioners seldom appear in court. They handle
matters of law practice up to varying points but stop short of representation in a court of record. Only in justice of the peace courts and
probate courts, and before commissions exercising judicial functions
have they yet the temerity to appear. Consequently in the present
state of the development of the unauthorized practice, they occupy
the position of intermediaries, between the client on the one end and
the lawyer on the other, in cases where actual institution of suits is
involved. Sometimes the unauthorized practitioners divide the field
of practice between themselves and their commercial allies. For instance,
as we have noted, the collection agency contacts the owner of accounts,
the law list bargains for the services of the lawyer. Together, they
constitute a pair of intermediaries between- the owner of the commercial
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account and the lawyer. Each, of course, levies tribute on the item of
practice as it passes through his sphere of influence. In this particular
instance, the law list and the collection agency are standing shoulder to
shoulder in the fight against the suppression of unauthorized commercial practice. Unable to defend their position on the ground that their
activities are within the law, and unable to defend their activities as
intermediaries doing for the lawyer that which he might not do for
himself, they raise the camouflage "in the public interest."
9.

The American Bar Association examines the law lists.

The Missouri Bar's drive against unauthorized practice, begun
simultaneously against the law lists and collection agencies, among
others, produced results quicker in the case of the law lists because the
institution of suits were necessary in the case of the collection agencies
but not in the case of the law lists. Stung by the action of the Bar
of Missouri,' subsequently radiating to other states, the law lists have
taken their troubles to the American Bar Association. The American
Bar Association has appointed a special committee to make a study of
the law list question and to report thereon.
10. Law lists predict the Committee's Report.
What the report of this Committee will be, we of the Missouri
Bar do not know. However, the publisher of The American Lawyers
'Supreme Court Rules relating to Law Directories and Law Lists.
Rule 35-Section 43 as amended October 18, 1935:
43-Law Directories and Law Lists, Publication of Professional Card.-A lawyer may insert
his professional card and that of his lawyer associates in a reputable law directory or reputable
law list. The card with propriety may contain only a statement of his and their name.
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses, special branches of the profession practiced, dates
and places of birth, dates and places of admission to the Bar, the schools attended, the dates
of graduation and the degrees received, the bar associations of which the subscriber and his
associates are members. The card may also give references or names of clients for whom the
lawyer and his associates are counsel with their permission in writing filed with the publisher.
A "law directory" as used herein is a publication containing a roll of all lawyers engaged
in the practice which the directory purports to cover.
A "law list" as used herein is a publication containing a selected list of lawyers engaged
in a particular line of practice or in the general practice.
A publication, the prime purpose of which is not the listing of lawyers, or which contains
a roll of laywers as an adjunct to other matter not addressed to the profession, is not within
the term "law directory" or the term "law list."
Law lists and law directories may be maintained as instrumentalities of the subscriber
lawyers for the purpose of affording media of contact between lawyers.
A reputable law
directory or reputable law list is a publication which, as the instrumentality of its subscribers,
serves the profession with fidelity and does nothing to cause its subscribers to be guilty directly
or indirectly of any professional misconduct.
A publication the circulation of which is not confined to members of the profession is
not within the term "reputable law directory" or the term "reputable law list."
A publication which guarantees to its users the fidelity of its listees through bond, guaranty
or any other similar means is not a reputable law directory or reputable law list. A lawyer
who places his name or card in a publication which he knows is not a reputable law directory
or reputable law list is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
Rule 36-New Section 18 adopted October 18, 1935:
18-Law Directories and Law Lists-Supervision by Advisory Committee. The Advisory
Committee to the General Chairman of the Bar Committees is hereby given the power and
charged with the duty of determining what publications come within the term "reputable law
directory" or the term "reputable law list" as defined by Section 43 of Rule 35 of this Court.
The Advisory Committee is further given the power to investigate and determine whether
the service rendered by any particular law directory or law list in affording a medium of contact
between lawyers, justifies its patronage by the bar.
The findings of the Advisory Committee with reference to compliance by law directories
and law lists with Section 43 of Rule 85 of this Court,.and with reference to service rendered
by them shall be announced to the Bar of this State.
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Quarterly presumes to know what the final report of the Committee
will be. In a pamphlet entitled "Regimentation of the Bar," circulated
by him, this publisher, Mr. Marc Grossman, confidently infers that
the Special Committee, in its report to the Association, will find that
his and other unapproved lists are necessary to the public welfare and
the conduct of modern business and essential to "interstate commerce."
(This last phrase aptly describes Mr. Grossman's appraisal of the practice of law.)
These unapproved lists insist upon substituting a bond
for the fidelity of their listees, upon soliciting business for their listees,
upon dividing fees with their listees through the charge for listing and
upon selling law practice controlled by them.
Therefore, we are told that the American Bar Association is going
to countenance the splitting of fees, the solicitation and sale of law practice, and the substitution of a bond for character, because the Association
feels that these commercial institutions are necessary in the public interest
to supply an assumed defect in the makeup of its members. As a member of that great Association of lawyers, and speaking for the integrated
Bar of Missouri, among which is found many of the Association's
greatest advocates, permit me to say that Mr. Grossman's prediction of
the Committee's findings are not only unwarranted and presumptuous,
but a direct affront to the members of the Committee who have assured
many members of the Association, both in formal reports and otherwise, that they had reached no decision upon the matter. We feel confident that that Committee's report will reflect the conception of the
public interest, established by decisions of courts and public estimation
since the establishment of the bar as an arm of the administration of
justice, rather than the conception of the public interest so recently
evolved by the unauthorized practitioners and their allies who speak
of the practice of law as intra- and interstatecommerce.
11.

Return of law practice to lawyers will result in satisfaction
of public demands of the bar.

If the practice of law is returned in its entirety to lawyers tb@
three things, most demanded by the public of the bar, will be accomplished. First, the lawyer's, economic security, endangered by preying
intermediaries and by competition with the unauthorized practitioner,
will be restored. Then will cease the great bulk of unprofessional conduct caused by economic pressure. Second, procedural reforms demanded by the public will have the attention of a bar which since the
rise of the unauthorized practitioner and the intermediary has not had
the time to quit the fight for existence long enough to give to that subject the study and time that is owed. Third, professional conduct
freed of the menace of commercialization, will be further refined.
12.

Outlook of the bar is broadening.

As we live we grow. As we grow we seek higher goals. At the
outset we announced the objectives of the State Bar of Missouri as the
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attainment of that state in our profession "when only lawyers handle
law practice; when a lawyer may sit in his office secure in the fact that
law practice comes to him and other members of the profession upon
merit alone; when we have reached that state where law practice, and
all the law practice, seeks the lawyer uninfluenced by unauthorized
practitioners, uninfluenced by intermediaries and uninfluenced by unprofessional conduct." To those objectives, we have added the attainment of that state in our profession when the lawyer, being sole custodian of the law practice shall have ceased the enervating battle against
the unauthorized practitioner, his allies, and accompanying unprofessional conduct; when the lawyer shall have the means and the time to
render the free public aid which the public has the right to demand of
the profession; when he is able to engage in legal research and the perfection of our judicial system, both matters in the prime public interest
and both matters to which the bar as a whole is unable to devote its
attention in its struggle for existence against those now striving to
commercialize the bar.
13.

Will the American Bar Association keep pace with the integrated bars?

No agency, voluntary or official, lay or professional, has been able
to contribute so much to the advancement of the welfare of the bar and
the attainment of these objectives as the integrated bars of the United
States, now numbering seventeen. These official bar associations, these
arms of the state governments, have not been masters of the bar nor
ends in themselves but are the weapons with which the profession is
regaining the prestige of the day of John Randolph and William Pinkney. Some pressing local problems within the jurisdiction of the various state bars will soon be in hand; then will come the welfare of the
profession throughout the nation. Then will come the necessity for
national concert of action to consolidate the gains. The integrated bars
of America will have to find an outlet for their endeavors in some
national association of lawyers. With the renovation and democratization of the American Bar Asso;iation that body appears to be the
logical meeting point for the efforts of the integrated state bars. At this
regional meeting here are gathered the representatives of the integrated
bars of several states who have come to meet and work within the
American Bar Association. I know, because I feel it myself, that the
American Bar Association has been recently reborn. It is on trial with
the integrated state bars of the United States. If the American Bar
Association is to be, as often suspected, an affiliate of the commercial
world imbued primarily with commercial interests above professional
interests, the integrated state bars will find another meeting ground.
We in Missouri feel that the American Bar Association is primarily a
professional group; that it will express itself in the public interest with
due regard to commerce in its rightful place as a beneficial public unit.
Then and only then, will it grow and prosper as an association of lawyers formed and maintained in the public interest.

INSURANCE; PAYMENT OF PREMIUM-Light vs. Equitable Life Insur-

ance Company-No. 14027-District Court of El Paso County.
Hon. John M. Meikle, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Company issued policy for $3,000.00 on life of plaintiff's husband, on quarterly premium paying basis. The first installment was paid in advance of the execution of the policy which provided
for the payment of a like sum "on or before the 27th day of June,
September, December and March of each year until the death of the
insured."
Another provision set out that "a failure to pay any
premium note or premium extension agreement when due and payable
shall cause the policy to cease and determine," with certain exceptions.
It also provided that payment of any premium should not maintain
the policy in force beyond the date when the next payment was due
and that any indebtedness to the company on account of the policy
and any unpaid portion of the premium for the current insurance year
in which the death of the insured occurred would be deducted in any
settlement under'the policy. After delivery of the policy and payment
of first quarterly premium, the insured and plaintiff, as beneficiary
delivered the policy to defendant with application for a change of
premium paying provisions from quarterly to annual basis, and insured
submitted therewith three promissory notes each bearing date of issuance of policy drawing interest and each being for part of the premium
maturing three, six and nine months after the date of the policy. Each
note pledged that if it were not paid at maturity it was not to be considered as payment of the premium and that the policy would, thereupon, without notice, cease to be in force and would have no value.
This change was duly accepted. The first note matured June 27, 1933,
prior to which date the defendant notified insured of its maturity. No
payment was made and on November 30, 1933, insured died and
beneficiary sued when defendant refused to pay under policy on ground
that policy was not in force.
HELD: 1. The giving of the notes by the insured and acceptance thereof by defendant did not constitute a payment of a year's
premium extending the life of the insurance contract for one year from
its date and beyond the date of the death of the insured.
2. The insurance under the terms of the policy and the agreement of the parties did not extend beyond the 27th day of June, the
first quarter period.
3. The Court could not more definitely fix the rights of the insured than he did himself, and the beneficiary, of course, is bound by
what he signed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke, concur.
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-MALICE-PROBABLE CAUSE-Addington

vs. Bates-District Court of Ouray County-No. 14219-Hon.
George W. Bruce, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff was an undertaker at Montrose and defendant
was a registrar of vital statistics for Ouray County. C. died in Montrose County and plaintiff was employed to inter her body. The
registrar of vital statistics for Montrose County issued to plaintiff a
permit to remove the body to Ouray, where, without a bur'l permit
from any registrar of vital statistics, plaintiff caused body of C. to be
interred. Later, the defendant, by sworn complaint before a justice
of the peace of Ouray County charged plaintiff with a misdemeanor.
On trial before the justice, plaintiff was adjudged to be guilty. On
appeal to the County Court, he was acquitted. Predicated on such
facts, the plaintiff sued defendant for malicious prosecution and alleged that the defendant acted "maliciously and without probable
cause." The trial Court granted a non-suit.
HELD:
1. Defendant was officially concerned with activities
pertaining to burial of deceased persons in his district, and moreover,

in the discharge of his duties he was "subject to the rules and regulations of the state registrar" and to the law. Defendant believed that
a condition precedent to the interment of the body in his district was
the procurement of a burial permit from the registrar of that district
and so informed plaintiff. Plaintiff believed otherwise and "forced"
the issue. There is nothing from which malice on the part of the defendant could be inferred, and "malice is an essential element" in this
type of case.
2. Probable cause also appeared from plaintiff's showing. Where
a justice of the peace before whom the plaintiff was originally tried had
jurisdiction, and adjudged his guilt, and no showing that the conviction before the justice was procured by fraud or other improper

means, the element of probable cause, established by the first conviction,
is not eradicated by reversal on appeal.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Knous, concur.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-REDEMPTION-TAX SALE-PLEADING
-CORPORATIONS--CONSTRUCTION
OF STATUTES-PRESUMPTION OF TITLE-PLEADING-Bean vs. Westwood-District

Court of Clear Creek County-No. 14172-Hon. Samuel W.
Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. One having an equitable title may redeem from a
tax sale.
2. One who has a deed from record owner valid on its fact, but
which may be defective because not issued by the proper group of
officers of a defunct foreign corporation, has such an equitable interest
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that he may redeem from a tax sale and compel bolder of certificate to
surrender it and receive redemption money.
3. Statutes providing for the redemption of property sold for
taxes are to be liberally construed in favor of the redemption.
4. There is a presumption of title arising in favor of equitable
owner of property, and the treasurer, acting in a quasi judicial capacity
found that such owner, upon exhibition of his deed, was entitled to
redeem.
5.
Where one seeks to show that under the laws of a foreign
state, a corporation was defunct, reliance upon the statutes of such state
could follow if the statutes had been pleaded. The nonexistence of
the foreign corporation, brought about by state officials acting under
laws of a foreign state, is a question of fact, and it must be pleaded.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke, concur.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-MUTUAL

WILLS-WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE

-EQUITY-Re: Estate of John H. Williams, deceased-Williams
et al., vs. Polland-DistrictCourt of Denver-No. 14177-Hon.
Robert W. Steele, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Proceeding under a petition labeled as being for the construction of the will of John H. Williams. John H. Williams and
Mary E. Williams married late in life and after Mary E. Williams had
had two children with a former husband. No other children were born.
They contemporaneously executed separate wills, each giving to the
other a life estate in all of their property, with remainders in the case
of Mary E. Williams to her children and in the case of John H. Williams to his brother and four nieces. Mr. John H. Williams died and
his will was filed for probate. Mrs. Mary E. Williams, the widow,
filed her written renunciation of any benefits under the will and elected
to take her share of the property under the statute. Thereafter, she
filed her claim for widow's allowance, and upon her petition, she was
awarded certain real estate previously owned by the husband, in lieu
of cash. The widow died later and the administration of her estate
as on an intestate was commenced. Her will apparently was not found.
The petitioners, being the heirs of Mr. John H. Williams, allege that
the wills were contractual, mutual and reciprocal and ask that they be
decreed to be the owners in fee simple of the real estate in accordance
with the residuary clause of the husband's will and ask that the widow's
election to take under the statute be set aside and that the order for
widow's allowance and the award of the real property in lieu of cash
be vacated and that the administration of her estate, as an intestate, be
enjoined. The County and District Courts upheld the validity of the
widow's allowance and award. In neither case were any findings made
with reference to the alleged mutuality of the wills.
HELD: 1. It has been uniformly held that a claim for widow's
allowance is a claim against the estate of her deceased husband and that
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she is entitled to the allowance independent of her distributive share in
her husband's estate.
2. Where the husband leaves a will, the widow is entitled to the
allowance regardless of any election to take or not to take under the will.
3. This rule is not changed by the fact that the husband and
wife may have executed mutual wills, in itself, and in the absence of
any effective waiver of the widow's allowance by the wife.
4. A widow may waive her allowance by contract with her
husband; but the waiver cannot arise by presumption, assumption, or
construction.
5. Where there has been a violation of the agreement upon which
the mutual or reciprocal wills are based, a Court of Equity, by reason
of its extraordinary power to enforce specific performance of contracts
and to prevent frauds, in an appropriate suit and proper case, enforces
such agreement in an equitable manner by decreeing specific performance
of the agreement or by impressing a trust upon the property in favor
of the parties aggrieved by the violation of the agreement.
6. No opinion is expressed upon the issue of the alleged mutuality of the wills and the authority of Mrs. Williams to revoke her will,
if she did, nor her right to elect to take under the statute if the wills
were mutual, leaving such matters to be determined, if and when they
are raised, in an appropriate proceeding.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - PLEADING - STATUTES - CHARTER
PROVISIONS-NOTICE OF INJURY IN PRIVATE PLACE-Emily

Horst vs. City and County of Denver-District Court of Denver
14130-Hon. Charles C. Sackmann, Judge-Affirmed.
-No.
FACTS: City maintained a baseball park within its corporate
limits across the street from which plaintiff resided. One afternoon
while a game was in progress, plaintiff, in the act of opening the front
door of her residence, was struck by a ball and sustained the injuries
for which she claims damages.
The Statute requires notice to the City in all cases of claim for
damages for personal injury, whereas the charter requires such notice
only where the injury occurs in a public place. This injury occurred
in a private place. Plaintiff's position is that the charter provision
superseded the statute in toto, hence in case of injury in a private place
no notice is required. The city's position is that the charter superseded
the statute only in so far as the two were in conflict; or covered the
identical subject; that since the statute relates to injuries in both public
and private places and the charter relates to injuries in public places
only, the statute is still in force in Denver so far as it covers injuries in
private places, hence notice to the City must be given and pleaded.
The trial Court sustained defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint.
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HELD: 1. A statute relative to notice of personal injury sustained in a private place is not superseded by a charter provision relative
to notice of personal injury sustained in a public place.
2. Where a charter provision and a statute do not cover the

same subject matter and are not in conflict with each other, they both
apply, and the statute governs such situation not referred to or covered
by the charter.
3. There is no prejudicial error where trial Court strikes from
a complaint a conclusion of law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr.
Justice Knous, concur.
QUIET TITLE

-

MINING LEASES -

ASSIGNMENTS -

LEVY

-

REAL

ESTATE-Routt County Mining Company vs. Stutheit, et al.District Court of Routt County-No. 14070-Hon. Charles E.
Herrick, Judge-Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.
FACTS:
Action to quiet title under a mining lease from the
United States. Plaintiff in error claims under an assignment from
lessee, Gwynn, while defendants in error claim under sheriff's deed
based upon a certificate of levy under judgment and execution against
Gwynn's interest in the lease. Plaintiffs obtained judgment against
Gwynn, and on September 15, 1933, an execution was issued and the
sheriff levied upon the coal lease in question as the property of Gwynn.
The certificate of levy was recorded the same day sheriff's sale was had
on October 21, 1933, and deed issued and recorded November, 1934.
On August 17, 1933, Gwynn assigned his lease to H. who in
turn transferred his rights to defendant mining company which went
into possession under the assignment about the middle of August, 1933,
and is still in possession.
HELD:
1. Where no transcript'of judgment has been filed, and
where a certificate of levy under such judgment was not recorded until
a month after the assignment of judgment debtor's interest in the lease,
the judgment creditor has no claim against the leasehold interest.
2. The fact that the assignee had knowledge of the judgment is
immaterial for the judgment creditors had no lien until they filed their
transcript or made a levy.
3.
A lease of land for a term of years is real estate.
4. Although the lease states that an assignment thereof may not
be concluded without the consent of the lessor, such a provision is for
the benefit of the lessor, and if he makes no protest, others may not
do so.
5. The judgment of trial Court must be reversed and the cause
remanded, with instructions to quiet the title in the defendant mining
company.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. En Banc. Mr. Justice Bouck
concurs in the conclusion.
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NEGLIGENCE-HUSBAND AND WIFE-THIRD PARTIES-RIGHT OF
CONSORTIuM-Giggey us. Gallagher TransportationCo., et at.District Court of Boulder County-No. 14157-Hon. Frederic
W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action to recover damages for alleged loss of "society
and consortium" of husband caused by injuries received by him and
allegedly occasioned by the negligence, etc., of the defendants. The husband sued and recovered judgment against the present defendants for
the same alleged injuries, which judgment was recently affirmed in the
Supreme Court. Defendants demurred to complaint. It was sustained
and plaintiff elected to stand on demurrer.
HELD:
1. The right of the wife to consortium of the husband
has not been directly invaded, and her loss has only resulted indirectly
from the negligent act of another. Her recovery for this indirect loss,
in the contemplation of the law, already has been realized indirectly
through the action by her husband in which he recovered damages for
the injury to which her indirect loss is attributable.
2.
The wrongful acts complained of were committed against
the husband and not directly against the wife.
3.
There is no authority supporting plaintiff's right to recover
for the loss of consortium above occasioned by the negligent acts of
third persons, and "there is legion of text and decided cases squarely
holding that she has no such right."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Knous, concur.
REAL ESTATEDEEDS OF TRUST-FORECLOSURE-GIFTS-PRESUMPTIONS-Howard vs. Barrett, et at.-District Court of Jefferson County-No. 14147-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, JudgeAffirmed.
HELD:
1. Where a mother advances money as a gift to her
daughter and son-in-law, part of which is used to purchase real estate
and part of which is used for the living expenses of the children, and
later purchases first deeds of trust on said property, and forecloses same,
a holder of a second deed of trust may not maintain a suit in equity to
establish a resulting trust subjecting the title of the mother, on foreclosure, to the second deed of trust, without showing that she assumed
or agreed to pay the obligation, or that the property was originally purchased for the mother.
2.
"The law presumes that such gifts arise between parents and
children and this legal presumption prevails until the contrary is clearly
and unequivocally established."
3.
Where there is sufficient competent evidence upon which the
trial Court could find that the mother dlid not participate in the transaction, did not sign the mortgage or in any way assume it, the decision
will not be disturbed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Knous, concur.
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PRACTICE OF LAW-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-ADVERTISING--CONTEMPT - NOTARY PUBLIC - People vs. Kinsey-No. 14065-

Original Proceedings-Rule Discharged.
FACTS:
Information filed by Attorney General charging Kinsey
with advertising and representing to the public that he had authority
to perform the functions of an attorney at law and act in a legal capacity.
It was also charged that Kinsey caused to be inserted in a weekly newspaper, under the caption, "Business and Professional Directory," an
advertisement as follows: "G. W. Kinsey, 1889 South Pearl. Legal
Documents."
It appeared that the advertisement appeared under the
subcaption, "Notary."
It was further alleged that he caused to be
filed with the Inheritance Tax Department, a Petition for the appraisal
and waiver of taxes in a particular estate, and that he was not licensed
to practice as an attorney. The Respondent admitted the advertisement, but contended that it was not his intention to practice law.
HELD:
1. "The advertisement is as consistent and reasonable
if interpreted to mean that respondent will take acknowledgments or
certify legal documents, as it is if construed to mean that he will write
legal documents contrary to law," and the penalty of being held in
contempt of Court, ane punishment therefor, will not be imposed on
the basis of facts resting on mere speculation.
2. A respondent will not be adjudged in contempt of Court
"on a record which discloses nothing more than that in a business
directory published in a weekly paper, his name, under the classification
of 'Notary,' appears in juxtaposition to the words 'legal documents'."
3. It is permissible for one in attending to his own personal
business of making a loan to be secured by a Trust Deed on real property which was, or at least which he feared was, subject to a tax, which
tax is a lien on the property until paid, when the encumbrancer has
notice, to file a petition to have an appraisement made and a waiver
issued by the Inhe.itance Tax Department on the property on which
he was making the loan.
4. If there was no administration of the estate in which the
real estate was involved, the signing of Respondent's name as attorney
for an estate to an application for such appraisal and waiver, was not
practicing law, nor a representation that he was authorized to practice law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Bakke not participating.
PRACTICE OF LAW-CONTEMPT OF COURT-People vs. Bennett-No.

14071-OriginalProceeding-Rule Discharged.
FACTS: Attorney General files petition to require B to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt of Court for engaging in the practice of law, "and for advertising and holding himself out
as having authority to perform the functions and duties of an attorney
at law and act in legal capacity." He is alleged to have caused a large
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wooden sign to be painted and erected on a street intersection, and upon
which sign appears the following words: "Walter B. Bennett, Lots on
easy terms, Free Notary Legal Papers, 2167 South Corona, Sp. 2872."
Respondent admits sign but denies ever holding himself out to the public
as having authority to practice law. He admitted having in his possession legal forms for deeds, bills of sale, chattel mortgages, etc.
HELD:
1. Where there is no proof that a respondent ever performed or held himself out as offering to perform legal functions, the
Court will not assume that he intended the public to understand that
he was willing to violate the law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Bakke, not participating.
PRACTICE OF LAW-CONTEMPT-People vs. Jersin-No. 14072Original Proceedings-Rule Discharged.
HELD:
1. The drawing of wills, as a practice, is the practice
of law.
2. Drawing three deeds and a will at one time for a friend and
fellow countryman, and accepting $13.00 as a gift, thereafter, from
such friend, is not sufficient upon which to base the conclusion that
the drawer is practicing law. It must be shown that he drew other
such instruments or that he holds himself out as willing or as competent to do so.
3. It is not true that all acts done by a lawyer and constituting
a practice of his profession, if performed by a layman, constitute a
practice of law by the latter. There is a twilight zone where the acts
done are to be judged by the surrounding circumstances.
4. Business is not the outgrowth of law; the practice of law is
the outgrowth of business. In the absence of explicit statute, Courts
should not be too ready to punish for contempt those who take care
of the exigencies of business so it may move forward to its designed
objectives.
5. Express intention to bring the Court into contempt is not
always necessary to constitute a contempt, but its absence is properly
to be considered as one of the circumstances of the case.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Bakke not participating.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-WRiT OF HABEAS
CORPUS--Opal Hill us. Roy Best-Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus-No. 1413 7--Original Proceeding-PetitionDenied.
FACTS:
Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Hill was convicted of burglary and larceny and was sentenced on both crimes,
sentences to run consecutively. He has now served the minimum
sentence first imposed for the burglary count. His contention is that
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judgment imposes a second sentence for one continuous criminal act
and thereby he has been placed in double jeopardy.
HELD:
1. Burglary and larceny are separate offenses and contain separate elements. A conviction for two distinct offenses is not
double jeopardy. This follows the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.
En Banc. Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
CONTEMPT-PRACTICING LAW -

P. G. Wicks -

No. 14066 -

ATTORNEYS AT LAW -

People Vs.

Original Proceedings-

Rule Dis-

charged.

FACTS: Defendant, a Notary Public, advertised "Legal Papers
made; deeds, trust deeds, mortgages, chattel mortgages, releases, extensions, affidavits, contracts, and wills." The Attorney General filed a
petition against him asking that he be required to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt of Court for engaging in the
practice of law and for advertising and holding himself out as having
authority to practice law.
HELD: As a Notary Public the defendant could do the various
things which the statute gives him power to do. "The record does not
justify even an inference that respondent sought to create in the mind
of anyone that he was a licensed attorney. It does not contain a suggestion that he ever drew a single legal paper where his acts were not
within the limits of the power conferred upon him by virtue of his
notarial office. He is not amenable to discipline under C. L. 1921,
Sec. 6017, for his belief or his intent alone, and even if so for an overt
act, that is neither charged nor admitted."
En Banc. Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -

FINDINGS OF FACT -

POWERS OF

DISTRICT COURT-The American Mining Company, et al., vs.
Martin Zupet-District Court of Denver-No. 14207-Hon.
George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
This is a workmen's compensation case in which claimant sought compensation for total loss of right eye, partial disability

of left eye and left ear. The commission awarded claimant disability
for total loss of right eye, but denied his other claims. The trial Court
disagreed with the commission's findings, and reversed it.
HELD:

1.

There was sufficient competent evidence upon which

the commission properly could make the award which was set aside by
the District Court.
2.
The trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction and overreached the
limitations of its powers in changing the findings of the commission.

3.
The matter of determining the probative effect of evidence in
such cases, where there is a conflict, still remains exclusively with the
commission. In Dept.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke.
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LOST WILLS-HEARINGS-SETTING OF CASE FOR TRIAL, NOTICE OF
-DISCRETION
OF COURT-DISMISSAL-RECORD ON APPEAL-ORAL STIPULATIONS OF THE PARTIES-In re: Estate of Martin

Eder et al. vs. The Methodist Episcopal Church Association of
Fowler, Colo. et al.-No. 13967-Decided April 19, 1937-District Court of Otero County-Hon. John H. Voorhees, JudgeReversed.
FACTS: The sole question involved in this case is whether the
District Court of Otero County properly exercised its discretion in dismissing an appeal by caveators from a judgment of the County Court
admitting to probate an alleged lost will of Martin Eder, deceased,
against which a caveat had been filed by certain alleged heirs of said
deceased. It appears that counsel for caveators were served with notice
that counsel for proponents would apply to the court on May 7th for
setting of the cause; that on May 6th, one day before the notice required
counsel for caveators to appear, the court set the cause for May 16th, and
the clerk notified counsel for caveators by letter dated May 6, 1935, that
the case had been set for May 16th; that when counsel for caveators
appeared on May 15th and consented that the order be vacated and the
matter re-set for that day, he came in response to the notice of application
to set, and was not prepared for trial.
HELD: 1. It was an abuse of the court's discretion summarily
to dismiss the appeal without notice of the motion to dismiss being
served on counsel for cavators.
2. Both sides are in pari delicto regarding the condition of the
record on appeal.
3. Ordinarily, courts take no notice of stipulations of the parties
not in writing or not made in open court, but they will be considered
where the record is peculiar and incomplete.
4.

When the setting of the case for trial is not on the first day of

the term, a notice of application in writing must be served on opposing
counsel "not less than forty-eight hours before the time fixed in said
notice, and shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court not less than twenty-four hours before the time noticed for setting said cause."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-PURCHASE AFTER MATURITY-TRUST
DEEDS-NONSUIT-MATURE NOTES-McDermott vs. Perkins-

No. 14032-Decided April 19, 1937-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Dearmin, on October 9, 1931, purchased real estate, giving a second deed of trust for $1,000 to Blue and Horton to secure balance of purchase price. In July, 1932, Dearmin sold the property to
Perkins, defendant in error. Dearmin was to pay off his indebtedness to
Blue and Horton, evidenced by the second deed of trust, and convey to
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Perkins, subject to a first trust deed, and a second for $542.35, payable
$15.00 monthly. Blue and Horton accepted the balance due them on
the $1,000 note, and endorsed on the back thereof the amount Perkins
was to pay, and had Perkins sign the note as maker. The amount so
endorsed was $542.35, representing the balance of the purchase price to
be paid by Perkins to Dearmin. This arrangement was to avoid drawing a new second deed of trust in that amount. Dearmin then made
and delivered a deed to Perkins for the property. The note on December
16, 1932, was sold to McDermott, who, upon prior and subsequent
defaults in the payments, brought suit on the note. Perkins contends
that the proper course to have been pursued was a foreclosure of the deed
of trust, and not suit on the note. The court granted Perkins' motion
for a nonsuit, and McDermott assigns error.
HELD: 1. When Perkins assumed the mortgage as part of the
purchase price, his obligation to pay became absolute, and when he
signed the note, as part of the purchase price, he breathed life into it,
regardless of its condition prior to that moment, and he cannot possess
the property-which the evidence shows he does-and question the
validity of his debt for the balance of its purchase price, by reason of the
form of the evidence of the indebtedness.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-EVIDENCE-Ludlow et a[. vs. Ludlow

-No. 13915-Decided April 19, 193 7-District Court of Latimer County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Plaintiffs in error are hereinafter referred to as Mr. and
Mrs. Ludlow, respectively, and their deceased son as Myron. Defendant
in error, Ruth Ludlow, is referred to as Ruth. At the time of the death
of Myron, he and Ruth were husband and wife, but separated. She
had sued for separate maintenance and he had counterclaimed for divorce. Ruth brought this suit against the Ludlows for damages for the
alienation of the affections of Myron. At the trial much hearsay evidence was admitted concerning declarations of Myron, and there was
much evidence, all more or less prejudicial, and all immaterial, which
was allowed in evidence.
HELD: 1. To sustain this judgment requires that the court warn
parents to oppose in good faith the marriage of their children, to advise
with them in good faith about their marital difficulties after the relationship has been established, to offer them refuge when the home has been
broken up, and to support them in the maintenance of their legal rights
under such fortunate circumstances, only at the peril of being mulcted in
heavy damages for their loyalty to their offspring. Any such conclusion
is contrary to the well established law of all jurisdictions.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young dissent.
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EQUITABLE CONVERSION-LEASE AND OPTION-JUDGMENT CREDITORS-Chain O'Mines, Inc., et al., vs. Harry M. Williamson,
et al. District Court of Gilpin County - No. 14010 - Hon.
Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Chain O'Mines entered into a lease of its mine claims
and gave the lessee an option to purchase. Before lessee exercised its
option, a number of judgment liens were recorded against the property
and property sold. Upon the exercise of the option the Chain O'Mines
contended that the purchase price, which was paid into Court should
go to it and not to the judgment creditors in that the property was
converted into personalty as of the date of the lease and option, and
that levies of execution on the real property and its subsequent sale
were subject to the lease and option and were defeated upon its exercise and therefore, the purchase price remains the property of Chain
O'Mines.
HELD:
While doctrine of equitable conversion applies as of the
date of contract in unconditional sales contracts, yet as to an option
contract the conversion does not take place until its exercise if at all.
Therefore, Chain O'Mines' title was effectively divested by the Sheriff's sale and it had no right to the purchase price money. In Dept.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young, concur.

CRIMINAL LAW-PREJUDCIAL ERROR-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCEINSURANCE-ARSON-Peter Hanson Smith vs. State of Colorado
-No.
13996-Decided April 19, 1937-District Court of El
Paso County-Hon. Arthur Cornforth, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: To a judgment of conviction of "Arson-Fourth Degree," error is assigned. The information charged Hanner, Peter Hanson
Smith (plaintiff in error) and Wilson Smith with the alleged crime.
Severance of trial was had; Wilson Smith pleaded guilty, and Hannernot yet tried-testified as a witness for the people. The court considers
only one assignment of error, to the effect that in permitting a witness on
rebuttal to testify that one Thompson was a "notorious fire bug," and in
substantiation thereof to allow the introduction of an exhibit showing
what was said to be a picture of Thompson, adorned with a number,
and bearing legend of Thompson's conviction of arson, the court mate,rially prejudiced plaintiff in error. It appears that on March 28, 1935,
plaintiff in error purchased a hotel; that sometime the following month,
Thompson bargained to buy one-half interest in the property; that when
contracting to buy an interest in the property, Thompson insisted that
the insurance thereon should then, and before he purchased it, be raised
from $3,500 to $25,000; that on Thompson's demand, plaintiff in
error did take out $15,000 insurance on the building and $5,000 on the
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furnishings. Later Thompson could not raise the necessary money and
the sale was rescinded. On October 5, 1935, plaintiff in error sold and
conveyed the property to Hanner, and at the same time assigned the
insurance policies to Hanner. There was an attempt to burn the hotel
on February 28, 1936, but only Wilson Smith had to do with the actualities at the time of the event.
HELD: 1. It is vitally important that nothing be introduced in
evidence, not relevant to the crime charged, which would naturally prejudice the jury.
2. Hanner, not plaintiff in error, owned the property involved,
held the policies of insurance, and, legally, was the one in a position to
gain from destruction of the property. Considering the showing as of
the time the testimony in chief was closed, the jury may well have been
in doubt as to where the truth lay, and the casting into the scales of
justice at the last moment the story about Thompson, who did not
testify and was neither on trial nor accused in the information, was probably calculated to influence the balance adversely to plaintiff in error.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
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